Dwight David Eisenhower

Dwight David Eisenhower
Born	David Dwight Eisenhower
Other names	Ike

Dwight D. Eisenhower was the general of the Allied armies on the Western Front from 1944 to 45.

Adulthood

Between late November to Early December 1944

Around this time period the overstretched situation of the Allied troops was causing constant concern, particularly with Bradley and his sector of the allied front. Einsehower and assumingly SHAEF thought it more important to concentrate the available forces in the area towards the Roer dams in the north and towards the south, the Saar. As a result, the defensive and less-active force in the Ardennes region was weakened. For some time there were only three divisions total on the approximately 120 kilometer (75 mile) front in between Trier and Monschau. In this situation no more than four divisions from the First Army were able to be allocated there, otherwise other sectors that were more situated for offensive would have to be sacrificed of units.

During this time Eisenhower's staff kept close watch of the situation in the Ardennes while Eisenhower himself conferred with Bradley on several occasions about it.

7 December - Meeting with Montgomery at Maastricht and travel through the Ardennes

On 7 December, the planned meeting that Montgomery had asked for was held in Maastricht on this day. Eisenhower began traveling his way towards Maastricht, and went through the Ardennes sector en route. He noticed how thinly the lines there were held. Being miles behind the front he saw little to no American soldiers, transports, or installations. Assuming when he in Maastricht, while Montgomery wasn't present, Eisenhower conferred with Bradley again on this issue. They (in particular Bradley) concluded that while it was true that the weakness of the Ardennes sector was a risk, it was better kept that way instead of halting the attacks going on in other sectors in order to play it safe while waiting for the reinforcements from the states to come to bring up the Allied forces to more strength.

While convening with him Bradley outlined the following factors in favor of continuing the status quo of the aforementioned continuing offensives in other sectors:

1. He pointed out the large gains that they were creating in the matter of casualties, as the average daily casualty losses of the Germans were double that of the Allies
2. Bradley believed that the sole place that the Germans could try to make a serious counter attack against was in the Ardennes sector. He felt that if this were to occur, the positions of two parts of Twelfth Army Group, that of Patton's flank in the south, and Hodge's flank north of the Ardennes, were in perfect position to counterattack against an attempt.
3. Bradley believed that if the Germans tried to attack, the German supply situation would be incredibly difficult whilst advancing to the Meuse. This was of course if they were able to somehow capture supply dumps all the way. If they were unsuccessful in this, the Germans would be in particular trouble, especially when the Allied air forces could be present to stop them.

With these points Eisenhower emphatically agreed. Bradley then proceeded to draw on the map where the estimated that the enemy spearheads could possibly reach. Within the areas the believed would be overrun, there were very few supply depots that he placed. The large depots that they had in the region were in Liége and Verdun, neither of which Bradly possibly thought the Germans could ever reach. He was for sure certain that they could always prevent the Germans from reaching the depots west of the river. Therefore with that conclusion any attempt of a counterattack by the Germans would prove unsuccessful.

The two generally concluded that it would be costly to remain still and do nothing to wait for the enemy to try a major counter-offensive before admitting final defeat, all the while the Germans would be perfecting their defenses and training their troops.

Bradly finally concluded saying:

We tried to capture all these Germans before they could get inside the Siegfried. If they will come out of it and fight us again in the open, it is all to our advantage."

It can be therefore concluded that at least among Bradley and Eisenhower and probably other generals, there was no fear of the Germans attempting a counterattack across the Siegfried Line. They believed they had more cards stacking in their favor compared to their Germans.

16 December 1944 - Beginning of the Ardennes counteroffensive

On 16 December, Bradley came over to Eisenhower's HQ to discuss with him of ways to overcome the shortages in infantry replacements. Right as he entered his office, a staff officer entered to report that there had been slight penetrations within the front of Middleton's VIII Corps, along with the right of General Gerow's V Corps in the Ardennes. The staff officer proceeded to point out on the map where theses penetrations had occurred. Ike and Bradley started discussing the possible meaning of such. Eisenhower himself wasn't convinced that it was just some small or local attack if it was only a minor offensive, that is unless if it was a feint to draw the Allies' attention there while they launched a larger attack somewhere else. As such the idea that it was a minor attack was ruled out of the question. Additionally, other sectors of the front had either little objective gains for the enemy or the strength of the Allies was too much, therefore this spot was better suited for defeating the Allies and achieving an objective.

Previously for a few days before 16 December they knew that there was a gradual buildup in the Ardennes. Another indicator was the fact that this was the area that the Germans penetrated through in May 1940 going on to defeat the Allies in the Battle of France. It is possible that von Rundstedt was trying to play a repeat of his success there. It is made clear therefore that Eisenhower and Bradley acknowledged that there was a potential objective that they could achieve for a gain, however it isn't known exactly what objective they were thinking of. Maybe they were indeed thinking that the Germans were trying to repeat May 1940 and create an encirclement to trap the Allied armies in the Northern sectors.

Whatever the case, these conclusions played into the previous ideas that they had that the Germans were going to have one more major counter-offensive before their admittance to final defeat, in particular one towards the center of Twelfth Army Group. The two agreed to start moving units on both flanks towards the center. Instead of being a precautionary move, this was a prelimitary one to support the thinly stretched Allied line in the sector. They called in a number of SHAEF's staff, particularly, Marshal Tedder, General Smith, General Harold R. Bull, and General Strong. Looking at the map portrayed the bulk of the US armored divisions were not on the front lines and so therefore could be moved towards the Ardennes quickly.

Eisenhower ordered Bradley to move the 10th Armored Division (commanded by Major-General William H. Morris Jr.) in the south in Patton's army, and the 7th Armored (commanded by Major-General Robert W. Hasbrouck) in the North, to the flanks of the German counter-offensive. This was despite the fact that Patton was eagerly preparing for the offensive in the Saar that was supposed to start soon and so would protest thinking it would gain many results, but Bradley and Ike thought the current situation justified the decision as given the locations of the unit concentrations on the Ardennes flanks. In any case, they judged that this was a critical moment of decision.

Next Bradley ordered the commanders on both flanks within his Army Group to alert their available divisions to be ready move toward the Ardennes if needed. The SHAEF staff present began closely looking over their reseves that were available to deploy. They accounted for General Ridgeway's XVIII Airborne Corps stationed near Reims, comprising of the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions, still resting and restoring from Operation Market Garden. Despite this and the fact that they weren't units suited for supporting heavy weapons, Bradley felt that he could supply them from an unthreatened part of his line. They were therefore sent to the front with the 101st Airborne Division being directed to Bastogne.

Bibliography

• Eisenhower, Dwight (1948). Crusade in Europe (1st ed.). William Heinemann Limited. ISBN 9780801856686.
• Eisenhower, Dwight. Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945 (PDF).
• Wilmot, Chester (1972). The Struggle for Europe. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 0837157110.
• Marshall, George. Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War, 1 July 1939 - 30 June 1945 (Reprinted 1996 ed.). Washington D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History. ISBN 0160486572.