Dwight David Eisenhower

Dwight David Eisenhower
Born	David Dwight Eisenhower
Other names	Ike

Dwight D. Eisenhower was the general of the Allied armies on the Western Front from 1944 to 45.

Adulthood

Between late November to Early December 1944

Around this time period the overstretched situation of the Allied troops was causing constant concern, particularly with Bradley and his sector of the allied front. Einsehower and assumingly SHAEF thought it more important to concentrate the available forces in the area towards the Roer dams in the north and towards the south, the Saar. As a result, the defensive and less-active force in the Ardennes region was weakened. For some time there were only three divisions total on the approximately 120 kilometer (75 mile) front in between Trier and Monschau. In this situation no more than four divisions from the First Army were able to be allocated there, otherwise other sectors that were more situated for offensive would have to be sacrificed of units.

During this time Eisenhower's staff kept close watch of the situation in the Ardennes while Eisenhower himself conferred with Bradley on several occasions about it. They concluded that while it was true that the weakness of the Ardennes sector was a risk, it was better kept that way instead of halting the attacks going on in other sectors in order to play it safe while waiting for the reinforcements from the states to come to bring up the Allied forces to more strength.

While convening with him Bradley outlined the following factors in favor of continuing the status quo of the aforementioned continuing offensives in other sectors:

1. He pointed out the large gains that they were creating in the matter of casualties, as the average daily casualty losses of the Germans were double that of the Allies
2. Bradley believed that the sole place that the Germans could try to make a serious counter attack against was in the Ardennes sector. He felt that if this were to occur, the positions of two parts of Twelfth Army Group, that of Patton's flank in the south, and Hodge's flank north of the Ardennes, were in perfect position to counterattack against an attempt.
3. Bradley believed that if the Germans tried to attack, the German supply situation would be incredibly difficult whilst advancing to the Meuse. This was of course if they were able to somehow capture supply dumps all the way. If they were unsuccessful in this, the Germans would be in particular trouble, especially when the Allied air forces could be present to stop them.

With these points Eisenhower emphatically agreed. Bradley then proceeded to draw on the map where the estimated that the enemy spearheads could possibly reach. Within the areas the believed would be overrun, there were very few supply depots that he placed. The large depots that they had in the region were in Liége and Verdun, neither of which Bradly possibly thought the Germans could ever reach. He was for sure certain that they could always prevent the Germans from reaching the depots west of the river. Therefore with that conclusion any attempt of a counterattack by the Germans would prove unsuccessful.

The two generally concluded that it would be costly to remain still and do nothing to wait for the enemy to try a major counter-offensive before admitting final defeat, all the while the Germans would be perfecting their defenses and training their troops.

Bradly finally concluded saying:

We tried to capture all these Germans before they could get inside the Siegfried. If they will come out of it and fight us again in the open, it is all to our advantage."

It can be therefore concluded that at least among Bradley and Eisenhower and probably other generals, there was no fear of the Germans attempting a counterattack across the Siegfried Line. They believed they had more cards stacking in their favor compared to their Germans.

Bibliography

• Eisenhower, Dwight (1948). Crusade in Europe (1st ed.). William Heinemann Limited. ISBN 9780801856686.
• Marshall, George. Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War, 1 July 1939 - 30 June 1945 (Reprinted 1996 ed.). Washington D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History. ISBN 0160486572.